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Assessing US Influence over India–Israel Relations: A Difficult
Equation to Balance?
Nicolas Blarel
Abstract: As India’s Israel policy evolved over time, the US involvement in this
bilateral relationship has been constant, albeit neither consistent nor direct. Breaking
with traditional state-centric approaches, this article focuses on the key role played in
shaping the nature of India–Israel ties by non-state and sub-state actors such as specific
political personalities, for example Congressmen Emmanuel Celler in the 1940s and
Stephen Solarz in the 1980s, as well as of pro-Israel interest groups based in the US,
like the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) and the American Jewish Committee (AJC).
The article shows that the US factor in India–Israel relations has evolved over time
depending on the personalities, political constellations in power in India and regional
developments in West Asia. Finally, while India, Israel and US interests seem to have
converged at some crucial junctures, the article argues that their policies and strategies
have rarely aligned over the long term.
In the summer of 1947, while many observers focused on the partition of theSubcontinent, one of India’s first major forays into diplomatic and international
politics was unfolding in the newly created United Nations (UN) in New York. On the
initiative of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, India lobbied to become a member of
the UN Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP). While this might have seemed
like a logical step for a newly independent India which aimed at signalling its
ambition to become a significant player in world politics, especially in the new global
institutional architecture emerging out of the post-World War II order, it also
embarked more or less knowingly into what would become one of its first major
disputes with the US. This lesser known historical debate which took place between
April and September 1947 at the UN structured a major bilateral disagreement
between India and the US for decades to come.
As India’s Israel policy evolved over time, moving from India’s initial opposition
to the partition of Palestine in September 1947 to the recognition of the state of Israel
in September 1950, and then from the decision to defer the establishment of diplo-
matic relations for 42 years to the post-normalisation development of strong bilateral
trade and military ties since 1992,1 US involvement in this bilateral relationship has
been constant, albeit neither consistent nor direct.
Various strands of scholarship have, for instance, insisted on the long-term
influence of the US on India’s policy of non-relationship with Israel. Some noted
that leaders like Nehru had regarded Israel as a state that had been set up with the
support of imperialist powers, and especially from the US.2 These notably point to
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Prime Minister Nehru’s criticism of the US government’s involvement in the Palestine
debate at the UN in 1947. Others argued that the prolonged estrangement between
India and Israel until 1992 could be explained by Cold War divisions.3 India and
Israel were two countries considered to be more or less integrated in the two rival
Cold War blocs, thus inhibiting any rapprochement.
However, both individual- and international-level arguments fail to understand
how the US influence on India’s Israel policy has varied over time, depending on the
leadership in power in New Delhi and Washington, the regional developments in West
Asia and the wax and wane of international factors such as the Cold War on both sub-
continental and West Asian politics. In addition, this article breaks with traditional
state-centric approaches which overlook much of the transnational activity that has
happened between the Indian, Israeli and US policy systems and societies. For
instance, it does not make the argument that the US directly and consistently
pressured New Delhi to improve its ties with Israel. In fact, this issue was not a
direct concern of US foreign policy towards South Asia and West Asia until the late
1980s. State-centric arguments have therefore neglected the indirect but decisive
influence and transnational networks of particular historical characters, which were
not in the executive branch or the foreign policy bureaucracy, such as US
Congressmen Emmanuel Celler in the 1940s or Stephen Solarz in the 1980s, as
well as of influential Jewish interest groups in the US political system, such as the
Anti-Defamation League (ADL) and the American Jewish Committee (AJC).
For instance, while initially in disagreement with US policymakers over the
conditions leading to the creation of the state of Israel, Nehru did maintain channels
of communication with Israeli leadership which were facilitated through the mediation
of American actors, albeit not part of government. This sustained dialogue can explain
India’s eventual recognition of Israel in 1950. In 1956, both India and the US
criticised Israel’s intervention alongside France and the UK during the Suez crisis.
After 1991, while the end of the Cold War and US lobbying for a change in India’s
approach to Israel towards the establishment of diplomatic relations in January 1992
were important factors, the story of US influence is of a more indirect and incremental
nature as it can be dated back and in the form of mediation of American Jewish
organisations to the mid-1980s.4 Finally, while the US has initially encouraged the
development of defence ties between India and Israel, its defence industries find
themselves today in direct competition with Israeli firms.
As a result, it is important to evaluate how interdependent were India–US and
India–Israel ties since 1947, but also to assess when and how American influence,
both direct and perceived, acted as a constraining or enabling influence over the
development of India–Israeli relations. The remainder of the article is organised as
follows: First, I discuss the initial exchanges between Indian and Jewish national-
isms in the 1930s which were facilitated by the mediation of certain US
actors. Second, I look at the US–India dispute over the creation of the state of
Israel, leading all the way to the recognition of September 1950. In the third
section, I explain the growing estrangement between the Indian and American
positions over the various West Asian disputes from the 1950s to the 1980s.
Fourth, I describe how US domestic politics, and especially certain US politicians
and interest groups, encouraged the rapprochement between India and Israel and
the normalisation of bilateral ties in January 1992. Subsequently, I evaluate in the
fifth section the evolving role of US support for defence ties between India and
Israel but also at possible hurdles as both American and Israeli defence industries
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increasingly compete for some markets. Finally, I conclude and suggest some
possible future trends in the India–Israel–US equation.
Pre-1947: Dialogue between Indian and Jewish nationalism through American
mediation
India’s Israel policy was formed in the pre-independence period, and most especially
when the Indian National Congress (INC) made its first statements on the Israel–
Palestine issue in the 1920s and 1930s.5 As a result, even before independence, there
were regular interactions between members of the INC with advocates for the creation
of the state of Israel, many of whom were US-based representatives of the Jewish
agency.
Because of the mainly European and North American origins of the immigration
movement to Palestine in the 1930s (mostly from Britain, Eastern Europe and the
US), Indian nationalists initially identified Zionism with its countries of origin.6 The
fact that the Zionist movement drew most of its financial and political support from
European and US sources initially led the INC leaders to consider Zionism as a
movement that was directly under the influence of British and American interests. In
parallel, since the major priorities for the Zionist movement were arms procurement,
fund raising and facilitating Jewish immigration in Palestine, the INC was not
considered a priority in its diplomatic efforts. The Zionist movement also avoided
identifying itself with other nationalist movements in Asia and made a tactical choice
to concentrate its diplomatic attention on British and American material and political
support.7
However, US-based Zionists regularly engaged with Indian nationalist leaders. By
the early 1930s, the Jewish agency attempted to establish contacts with Gandhi and
Nehru whom they considered to be influential personalities both in India and
internationally.8 By the early 1930s, the Jewish Agency also realised that it needed
to counter the anti-Zionist message circulated in India through the efforts of Mufti al-
Hussayni. For instance, Hayim Greenberg, editor of the US-based Jewish Frontier
newspaper, expressed his concerns about anti-Zionist sentiments spreading among
Indian Muslim communities in a letter he sent to Gandhi in 1937.9
Repeated efforts from American Zionists to get Gandhi to publicly express himself
about the Palestine issue paid off in 1938. However, his statements on Palestine
belonging to the Arabs and his condemnation of Zionist collaboration with imperialist
Britain in his famous 1938 Harijan article revealed the difficulties of the Jewish
Agency’s efforts in convincing the Indian nationalist leader of their cause. Americans
like Hayim Greenberg directly accused Gandhi of being biased and unfair towards the
Jews. He noted that Gandhi had overlooked the imperative existential need for a
Jewish homeland. Gandhi responded to this accusation in another column in Harijan
and even reproduced an abridgement of Greenberg’s letter, pointing out that he saw no
reason to change his opinion.10
According to Nehru, the problem of Palestine was primarily an Arab nationalist
struggle against British imperial control. By contrast, the Jewish issue was a minority
religious problem that had mainly been fostered by British policies. He notably
suggested a federal arrangement which would guarantee Jewish religious rights in
Palestine.11 Like Gandhi, Nehru too was approached by Zionist emissaries before and
after independence, who were looking for his support on the creation of a Jewish
state.
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After World War II, Gandhi’s position seemed to have evolved. Although he
condemned the persecution of the Jews in Europe in strong terms, he insisted that
restoring Palestine to the Jews, partly or wholly, as their national home would be a
crime against humanity, as well as against the Muslims.12 In spite of this statement,
Gandhi met the American Unitarian minister and pacifist John Haynes, who had been
sent by New York Rabbi and noted Zionist Stephen Wise.13 Gandhi also met in 1946
the American journalist Louis Fischer to whom he conceded that the Jews had a ‘prior
claim’ to Palestine. However, in a later article in Harijan in July 1946, Gandhi
clarified his position: he argued the Jews had been ‘wronged by the world’ but he
also criticised their reliance on American and British help as well as on terrorist
methods.14
These various statements demonstrate that Gandhi and Nehru did not have a static
opinion of the Palestine issue but instead a nuanced and evolving perception of the
situation, to some part informed by their meetings and discussions with American
Zionists and members of the Jewish Agency. Gandhi died a few months before the
creation of Israel, and did not therefore have any direct impact on India’s Israel policy.
By contrast, Nehru had a key foreign policy-making role after independence as he
held both the positions of prime minister and minister of external affairs. His early
contacts with American Zionists would prove important in the early post-
independence years.
1947–1950: the creation of Israel as a first disagreement between India and the
US
From April to September 1947, India and the US faced their first major diplomatic
dispute as the Palestine question was presented by the British to the UN General
Assembly (UNGA). Nehru supported the British proposal for the UN to deal with the
Palestine question and nominated Asaf Ali, India’s first ambassador to the US, as its
first representative to the Special UNGA Session on Palestine. Ali was given very
specific guidelines, notably to support a termination of the Mandate and ensure that
India would be part of any fact-finding committee on Palestine. Ali was also warned
not to commit the government to any position without any prior approval from New
Delhi, and to avoid raising issues which might ‘affect’ India’s relations with other
countries.15 The instructions showed that India’s position was not fixed and remained
open to debate. Furthermore, Nehru was conscious that India’s decisions would be
closely scrutinised by its international partners, especially the US.
At the UN, Ali actively argued against the interference and influence of great
powers, such as the US and UK, on the Palestine issue. After an intense debate which
lasted until May 15, 1947, it was decided that the five major powers (permanent
members of the UN Security Council [UNSC]) would be excluded from membership
of the specialised committee created to study the Palestine issue. Following Nehru’s
instructions, Ali lobbied for India to be a member of the UNSCOP. However, India
had problems integrating the initial list of neutral members of the Committee as
suggested by the US Ambassador to the UN, Warren Austin.
Nehru was disappointed with Ali’s performance, which contradicted his instruc-
tions to avoid controversy.16 Ali notably attempted to include in the Agenda of the
Special Palestine Committee a proposal which demanded the immediate termination
of the Mandate and the proclamation of the independence of Palestine. In addition, Ali
invited the Arab Higher Committee, represented by Mufti Hussayni, to talk before the
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Special Committee. However, he also supported inviting the Jewish Agency to testify.
Ali’s overt pro-Arab position led him to clash with other representatives on the
Committee.17 Nehru was therefore concerned that Ali’s stance could affect relations
with India’s Western partners and cautioned him against raising divisive issues such as
the Arab proposal for immediate independence. Nehru mentioned that he had heard
‘adverse comments’ following Ali’s statements and he recommended making ‘fewer
commitments’ on the issue.18 While Nehru wanted India to maintain its sympathy for
Arab grievances, he also preferred maintaining a cautious and open-ended policy to
not upset ties with the US.
Finally, the UNGA decided to appoint a more representative UNSCOP.
Membership was extended to two other members from the South Pacific and Asian
regions, which were underrepresented in the initial nine-member committee. The
expansion opened the door for India. After the initial reactions to Ali’s statements,
it became a priority for Nehru to reframe India’s position as a more balanced observer
of the dispute. One first move was to nominate Sir Abdur Rahman as India’s
representative to the UNSCOP. Nehru asked Rahman to support a federal solution
which had to gain Arab approval. However, given the strong divisions on this issue
and the uncertain outcome of the deliberations, Nehru also suggested to keep a
‘vague’ position and to remain ‘friendly’ to both parties.19 Nehru did not want
Rahman to make the same mistakes as Ali and to rhetorically commit India in one
direction.
However, significant disagreements emerged between Rahman and Nehru.
Rahman, for instance, expressed doubts about the continuing legal status of India in
the UN structure following the partition of the Subcontinent. Consequently, Rahman
defended India’s federal solution at the UNSCOP, but also offered a dissenting note
on August 14, 1947. Rahman agreed with Nehru’s position that partition was not a
viable solution as it would not lead to a lasting peace plan between Arabs and Jews.20
However, in his personal note, he rejected the federal solution which he judged
equally impractical as it was opposed by all parties.21 Ultimately, Rahman personally
supported a unitary state where a clear Muslim Arab majority (three-fourths) had a
right to self-determination. A partition scheme would, in the view of Rahman, be
opposed to the principle of self-determination.22 However, Rahman also argued that
religious, cultural, linguistic and educational rights should be defended by the con-
stitution of a new Palestinian state, and that there should be proportional quotas for
Jewish participation in government and other public offices.
The Jewish Agency closely monitored these disputes between New Delhi and its
representative given its apprehensions that Rahman would support the Arab case
within the UNSCOP. There were various efforts to inform Nehru of Rahman’s
perceived bias. American Congressman and Zionist Emmanuel Celler notably played
an important role by directly expressing his concerns about Rahman in a cable he sent
to Nehru. Celler was popular in India because of his support to the Indian struggle for
independence in the American Congress. In the 1940s, Celler also became an
advocate of more flexible US immigration laws to help Jewish refugees fleeing the
Holocaust. Celler had also been instrumental in facilitating the invitation of a Jewish
delegation to the New Delhi Conference of the Asian Relations Organisation which
took place in March–April 1947. India had initially invited 32 delegations, including a
delegation from Palestine. There was a strong opposition within the INC against
inviting a Jewish delegation.23 However, pressure from both Sarojini Naidu and
especially Nehru’s sister and India’s representative to the UN, Vijaya Lakshmi
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Pandit, who had discussed the issue with Celler in Washington, proved decisive.24
Following the conference, the Jewish delegation highlighted the importance of seek-
ing the assistance of US politicians who had supported both Indian nationalism and
Zionism, such as Congressman Celler. Consequently, in his response to Celler, Nehru
explained he had given instructions to Rahman that highlighted the quasi-judicial
character of the inquiry and confirmed India’s impartial stance.25
In October 1947, as the UNGA vote on the Palestine issue was nearing, Celler
attempted to influence the Indian voting by directly appealing to Pandit, who was
the Indian representative to the UNGA. The US supported partition, while India
supported a federal plan. Pandit had her personal reservations with Nehru’s
position.26 She notably had warned the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA)
through a letter on October 8, 1947 that India’s federal plan had little support as
both contending parties, including the Arabs, rejected it.27 In addition, a report was
reportedly sent to Ben-Gurion stressing the fact there had been a debate within the
Indian delegation on the voting and that Pandit had suggested to Nehru to abstain
on the partition plan.28
However, Celler’s efforts to sway India towards a support of the partition plan
proved unfruitful, as Pandit did not directly defy Nehru’s instructions from New Delhi
and the Indian delegation stood by its support for the federal plan on November 29,
1947. India and the US disagreed on the partition plan but also on the recognition of
the state of Israel following its proclamation of independence on May 14, 1948.
Although there was a debate in the Harry Truman administration, the US recognised
Israel within hours of the proclamation.29 On May 17, 1948, Moshe Sharret, the
minister of foreign affairs of the provisional government of Israel, sent a cable to
Nehru to seek India’s formal recognition of the new state of Israel.30 Eliahu Eilat
(Epstein), the representative of Israel’s provisional government of Israel in the US,
sent another cable to the Indian chargé d’affaires in Washington.31
Since there was no official reaction from New Delhi, Israel actively used the
channels of communication between Eilat and Indian diplomats in Washington and
New York to push for recognition. Israeli diplomats also tried to use India’s close
links with the US to pressure Delhi into changing its policy. Since the US financial
support at the time was considered by Indian decision-makers as necessary for the
success of India’s first five-year plan, diplomatic pressure (or at least a perception of
such) was considered important.32 Congressman Celler was regularly invited to meet-
ings between Israeli and Indian diplomats to help persuade the latter.33
In September 1948, after the second Arab-Israeli ceasefire was signed, India’s
Ambassador to the US, B. N. Rau, mentioned the possibility of recognition to his
Israeli counterpart Eliahu Eilat in Washington. In a later discussion in May 1949,
Pandit, now Indian Ambassador to the US, reportedly acknowledged to Eilat in
Washington that the situation in Kashmir had postponed the recognition.34 In
September 1949, following the acceptance of Israel as an official member of the
UN, Pandit assured Eilat that India was moving towards recognition.35 In
October 1949, during a visit to Washington, Nehru met with Ambassador Eilat and
Congressman Celler. Nehru explained that the recognition of Israel had been delayed
because of internal opposition which had to be treated carefully. Nehru did, however,
concede that recognition of Israel could not be indefinitely postponed.36 In a letter to
Sharett, Eilat also said that Nehru had directly discussed the impact of the ‘painful’
partition on the ‘30 million Indian Muslims’ and that the Palestine question was a
‘constant source of agitation’ for this community.37 Nehru reportedly also indicated to
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Celler that it would be ‘unwise’ for him to recognise Israel during his stay in the US
as it could be interpreted as ‘American pressure’.38
In spite of these regular meetings, India deferred the recognition of the state of
Israel until September 1950 and decided to indefinitely postpone the establishment
of diplomatic relations. As a result, barring a few exceptions, India and the US
stood at odds when it came to the Israel–Palestine dispute for the next four
decades.
1950s–1980s: India and the US on different sides of the West Asian divides
During three decades, India and the US stood on different sides of the sectarian and/or
geopolitical disputes which divided West Asia. For some time, their interests also
directly conflicted. This had an important effect on India’s policy towards Israel. In
the early 1950s, for instance, the US initiated an alliance, institutionalised through the
Baghdad Pact of 1955, which was officially conceived to contain Soviet Expansion in
West Asia and which included Pakistan.39 This alliance was perceived as directly
affecting India’s security interests as it permitted Pakistan to boost its military arsenal
and to thereby reject any diplomatic settlement of the Kashmir dispute. In order to
counter this new military alliance project, and the introduction of Cold War politics in
West Asia, Nehru decided to reinforce India’s relations with other Arab states such as
Egypt and Syria.
As a result, at that time, Nehru was reluctant to establish diplomatic relations with
Israel. India felt it was necessary to emphasise a shared outlook with Arab states on
most West Asian issues, including the Israel–Palestine dispute. Beyond Egypt, other
Arab states lauded India for its opposition to the Baghdad Pact and criticised
Pakistan’s membership. Saudi Arabia’s King Saud, two years after he had visited
and supported Pakistan on the Kashmir issue, expressed his disappointment that the
‘Islamic State of Pakistan should accede to those who have joined hands with the
Zionist Jews’ by joining a ‘Western Military Pact’.40 The rapprochement between
India and key Arab states helped to check Pakistan’s diplomatic attempts to create a
coalition of Muslim Arab states and to dispel the notion that the Government of India
was pro-Zionist following the recognition of Israel.
In spite of these contrasting diplomatic alignments in West Asia, India and the US
agreed to jointly condemn Israeli policies during the Suez crisis. In July 1956, the
Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser decided to nationalise the Suez Canal. This
sudden and drastic move was the result of a protracted political dispute which had
developed over a proposal between Egypt, the US and UK for the funding for the
construction of the Aswan High Dam. As the Suez Canal was a strategic trade link
which had remained under British control after Egyptian independence, the decision
to nationalise was considered a move that directly defied European powers which had
important stakes in the Canal.
India’s initial reaction was to support Nasser’s decision. Nehru argued in August
that the Egyptian decision complied with the terms of sovereign Egypt’s laws.41
However, looking to also support international legal principles, Nehru referred to
the ‘international character’ of the Suez waterway according to the Anglo-Egyptian
Agreement of 1954. Nehru equally regretted the ‘suddenness’ of the decision and of
its implementation, which directly affected European economic interests. The Indian
argument was that Egypt was competent to nationalise the Suez Canal but should
have done so in ‘the normal way of international expropriation’.42 Nehru therefore
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deplored the lack of consultation through UN-led mechanisms between the UK and
Egypt on this matter.
India’s position during the Suez crisis was not only shaped by moral and legal
consideration but also by its own national self-interest. Nehru was concerned by the
long-term consequences linked to the closing of the Canal to international circulation.
India was not a ’disinterested party’ but a ‘principal user of this waterway’ whose
‘economic life and development’ was directly affected.43 Consequently, India advised
all the involved countries to abandon threats, violence and unilateral acts in order to
avert an escalation to a crippling conflict in the region.44 In spite of these specific
national interests, Nehru directly corresponded with US President Dwight Eisenhower
and British Prime Minister Anthony Eden concerning a conference of the canal users
to be held in London. Nehru notably supported Eisenhower’s decision to include as
many participants as possible to the conference. Nehru also convinced Nasser to not
boycott the conference and to send one representative along with Krishna Menon, the
Indian representative to the London Conference.45
In spite of mediating efforts during the London conference, India did not manage
to broker an agreement between the various parties. Nehru was concerned by the risk
of escalation following the refusal of European countries to further negotiate after the
American proposal was rejected by Egypt. Nehru sent out a message to the Secretary
of State John Foster Dulles asking the US to exercise influence to stop British troops
from landing in Egypt. Dulles replied stating that ‘while the US would not support
any disregard of Egypt’s rights, it was not clear what precisely these rights were’.46
Because the Suez Canal was deemed to be of ‘vital importance’ to India, Nehru
continued to push for a ‘peaceful negotiated settlement’.47
Nehru therefore continued to urge Eisenhower and Eden to consider the
Egyptian proposals. The Foreign Ministers of Britain, France and Egypt initiated
private talks in New York, at which Krishna Menon was present in a mediatory
role.48 India was optimistic about a peaceful settlement until Israel launched a
sudden military attack on Egypt on October 29, 1956. Two days later, British and
French troops took control of the Suez Canal. Along with the US and USSR, India
sternly criticised the Anglo-French-Israeli operation. Nehru encouraged the US to
intervene. India denounced the Anglo-French ultimatum on the cession of the Suez
Canal as a ‘flagrant violation of the UN Charter’.49 In a letter sent to Dulles, Nehru
called the Israeli military operation as a ‘clear, naked aggression’ and argued that
‘the whole future of the relations between Europe and Asia hangs in the balance’.50
Arthur Lall, India’s ambassador to the UN, also urged the American Ambassador to
the UN Henry Cabot Lodge to stop the British-French-Israeli action against
Egypt.51
India’s priority was to put an end to a conflict which closed the access to the Suez
Canal. India backed the UNGA’s efforts in a Special Emergency Session to obtain an
immediate ceasefire by all parties and the withdrawal of troops behind the armistice
line. On November 2, 1956, India supported a US-sponsored resolution at the UNGA
that urged immediate ceasefire and asked all sides to withdraw behind the armistice
lines. This proposal came to be referred to as ‘the Eisenhower–Nehru formula’, and
Eisenhower was keen to quickly meet Nehru, ‘just the two of them because he
thought they came closer to commanding the respect of the world’.52 India also
agreed to contribute along with 10 other countries to the UN Emergency Force
(UNEF) on the condition that Egypt would agree to have such forces based on the
1949 demarcation line separating Egypt from Israel.
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India’s involvement in the Suez crisis and the subsequent deployment of the
UNEF was driven by an ambition to play an active mediating role between the
European powers (France and the UK), the great powers (the US and USSR) and
Egypt. Nehru and Eisenhower exchanged sustained correspondence during the crisis,
leading to a convergence of interests and a joint condemnation of the Israeli military
attack against Egypt.53
However, the Suez events and the condemnation of the use of military force were
one of the rare instances where Arab, US, Soviet and Indian positions aligned. While
the US gradually moved closer to Israel in the following years, Nehru and India broke
with the earlier position which had always left open the possibility of diplomatic
exchanges. After 1956, the establishment of diplomatic ties was explicitly discarded
as it was perceived as potentially hurting India’s relations with Arab states and
complicated India’s potential role as a mediator in the region. As a result, India and
the US would stand on opposite sides during the 1967 and 1973 conflicts, with New
Delhi unconditionally supporting Egypt and Syria and Washington standing behind
Israel.
However, in spite of this decision to defer the development of diplomatic relations,
Nehru still met with Israeli diplomats such as Abba Eban, Israel’s ambassador to the
US, in Washington in December 1956. In a meeting organised by the American
diplomat Chester Bowles, Nehru also met with Nahum Goldmann, the president of
the Jewish World Congress in 1957. Goldmann did not succeed in convincing Nehru
of the necessity of having diplomatic relations with Israel. He reportedly judged
Nehru’s attitude towards Israel to be ‘ambivalent’.54 The US back channel of com-
munication between Indian and Israeli officials was discontinued both because of the
personal decisions and dispositions of Nehru’s successors, Lal Bahadur Shastri and
Indira Gandhi, but also because of international alignment policies as India was drawn
closer to the USSR following the signing of the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace,
Friendship and Cooperation in 1971. The US would not play an indirect influence
on India–Israel relations until the 1980s.
1984–1992: US efforts in facilitating the India–Israel rapprochement
As the Cold War was waning in the 1980s, Rajiv Gandhi revived the US-based
diplomatic channels that his grandfather had previously built on to discuss with
Israeli authorities. The Rajiv Gandhi government was also trying to find solutions
to improve India’s relations with the US, and especially economic ties. Bilateral
relations had deteriorated since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the subsequent
US military aid given to Pakistan. Another negative development was the increasing
criticism of India’s ‘discriminatory’ treatment of Israel coming from the Jewish
community in the US, and particularly from the influential ADL.55 In May 1987,
the ADL published a report condemning India’s discriminatory behaviour vis-à-vis
Israel. The report highlighted the fact that India had refused to grant visas to Israeli
citizens since the mid-1960s and quoted numerous statements hostile to Israel. The
report explicitly recommended the imposition of US sanctions on India.
Consequently, the Indian Government became conscious that efforts should be
made to prevent pro-Israel American organisations from being obstacles to renewed
diplomatic efforts to engage the US. Certain steps were taken by Rajiv Gandhi’s
government to amend ties with Israel, even before the publication of the ADL report.
A few days before the 1985 UNGA annual session, Israel bombarded the Palestine
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Liberation Organisation (PLO) headquarters in Tunis. Rajiv Gandhi condemned the
attack and expressed his concern for the safety of Yasser Arafat.56 At the UN, India’s
Minister of External Affairs Bali Ram Bhagat also criticised Israel’s ‘aggressive and
expansionist policies’ and called the air raid a ‘threat to peace and security’.57 At first
glance, this position seemed in line with India’s traditional support of the Arabs and
Palestinians against Israel. However, the response in October 1985 was different. In
reaction to the raid, 18 Arab states sponsored a UNGA resolution calling for the
expulsion of Israel from the UN. Breaking with its traditional support for Arab-backed
resolutions, this time India decided to abstain.58 In fact, Rajiv Gandhi even met with
Israel’s Prime Minister Shimon Peres during the 40th UNGA session. This was the
first public meeting between two sitting prime ministers of the two countries. As
another indication of change, India also decided to relax the visa restrictions for Israeli
citizens. For instance, the Rajiv Gandhi government allowed an Israeli tennis team to
play against the Indian team in New Delhi for the Davis Cup Tournament in
July 1987.59
Rajiv Gandhi had also seemingly realised the influence of pro-Israel organisa-
tions and of specific personalities in Congress like Stephen J. Solarz on US policy
in that region.60 Solarz was a US Congressional Representative from New York. In
the 1980s, he chaired the Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee of the House
Foreign Affairs Committee. In the House, Solarz represented a district that had one
of the country’s largest Jewish populations, and he had been a long-time supporter
of Israel. He also had an interest in India, and was instrumental in setting up the
South Asia Bureau in the US Department of State.61 Rajiv Gandhi therefore
organised a meeting with Solarz and representatives of various American Jewish
organisations in June 1988 in New York.62 At the meeting in Rajiv Gandhi’s hotel
suite, in addition to Solarz the Chairman of the Conference of Presidents of Major
Jewish Organisations (and former President of the American Jewish Committee),
Morris Abram, the Conference’s Executive Vice Chairman Malcolm Hoenlein, the
President of the American Jewish Congress Robert Lifton, the Executive Director
of the ADL Abe Foxman, and the Executive Director of the American Jewish
Committee Ira Silverman, were present.63 Gandhi reportedly stated that he wanted
to improve economic and political ties with the US. The Jewish organisations
encouraged the Indian Prime Minister to change India’s policy towards Israel and
its citizens, notably on the question of visa restrictions.64 They also asked India to
pressure the Palestinians to renounce their call for the destruction of Israel and to
follow the Egyptian example.65 Some Israeli media later suggested that Prime
Minister Rajiv Gandhi had pledged during the meeting to upgrade official ties
with Israel.66
Soon after these discussions, India allowed an Israeli diplomat to be stationed in
Bombay (now Mumbai) as vice-consul. This was an important diplomatic move: since
the expulsion of the Israeli consul in Bombay by Indira Gandhi in 1982, India had
regularly refused requests to replace the position.67 In addition, a delegation of the
ADL and Congressman Solarz visited New Delhi in 1989. Two of the members of this
delegation had been signatories of the 1987 ADL report. The delegation met the
Minister of External Affairs Narasimha Rao, Foreign Secretary Alfred Gonsalves and
the MEA’s Joint Secretary to the Prime Minister P. K. Singh.68 One report stated that
the delegation of the ADL lobbied in favour of improved Indo-Israeli relations but
was notified that change would not be imminent.69 Following the meeting, there was
another diplomatic gesture towards Israel with the formal extension of the Israeli
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consulate’s jurisdiction by the Government of India to the southern state of Kerala
which had had a historical and relatively significant Jewish population.70
However, in spite of these discussions with pro-Israel organisations and a number
of important steps in the direction of change, the Rajiv Gandhi government was
unable to bring about a complete reversal of India’s foreign policy towards Israel.
Instead, in November 1988, India became one of the first non-Arab countries to
recognise the newly proclaimed state of Palestine. Domestic political and electoral
constraints and regional developments, like the Palestinian Intifada of 1987, restricted
any further rapprochement with Israel. US influence on India’s Israel policy further
increased in the early 1990s, especially in the aftermath of the Gulf War. India’s shift
of position regarding Iraq and its acceptance to let US military planes refuel at Indian
airports was a first important signal that India had to come to terms with the increased
American presence in the West Asian region.
The domestic economic crisis in India in 1991 and the disappearance of India’s
traditional Soviet partner also made New Delhi more dependent on US economic
support. In June 1991, Prime Minister Rao inherited an important economic crisis
from his predecessor. The crisis was an opportunity for a traditionally self-reliant
India to liberalise and to open its economy to the world. With his Finance Minister
Manmohan Singh, Rao fundamentally changed India’s economic policies. Rao nota-
bly sought investments and loans from international institutions such as the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, as well as from the US.71
The objective for Rao and Singh was to neutralise all obstacles in Washington to the
urgent loans India needed. As Minister of External Affairs in 1988, Narasimha Rao
had also been involved in discussions with Solarz and American Jewish organisations
and was therefore conscious that the lack of relations with Israel precluded a better
understanding with the US whose financial support was essential for India’s economic
recovery.
Consequently, India first joined the US-backed move to revoke the UNGA
Resolution 3379 equating Zionism with racism in December 1991. In the second
week of January 1992, the Director General of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Joseph Hadass met with the Deputy Chief of the Mission of the Indian Embassy in
Washington Lalit Mansingh. Reportedly, Hadass made it clear to Mansingh that it was
up for India to take the initiative of establishing diplomatic relations if it wanted to be
invited to participate in the nascent West Asian peace process.72 Narasimha Rao then
announced the establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel on the eve of a visit to
the UN in New York where he would meet with US President George H. W. Bush.
Following the announcement, Congressman Stephen Solarz also issued a press release
welcoming the new diplomatic development.73
1992–2016: the defence equation
Following the establishment of diplomatic relations between India and Israel in
January 1992, defence ties, and especially arms sales from Israel to India, became a
major component of this emerging partnership. The US role in the development of
defence relations has, however, been neither direct nor systematic. In fact, the Bill
Clinton administration initially opposed Israeli defence sales to India because of
technology transfer regimes and the embargo linked to the Indian nuclear tests of
1998. This situation evolved under the George W. Bush administration which then
openly encouraged defence cooperation between two partners it was openly trying to
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enrol in its global War on Terror. The contemporary situation is uncertain as both
American and Israeli defence industries are now openly competing for access to the
growing Indian market.
There were international obstacles to defence technology transfer in the 1990s.
Some of the Israeli technology which had been co-produced with the US could not be
shared without a prior approval from Washington. The US had, for instance, pre-
viously blocked the Israeli transfer of Lavi, patriot missile and Phalcon technologies
to China.74 Nevertheless, the US first indirectly helped Israeli defence industries gain
a foothold on the Indian market following the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests of
May 1998. In the immediate days following the tests, the US placed both India and
Pakistan under economic sanctions.75 The sanctions included banning US economic
assistance and the export of defence material and technologies.
Unlike the US, and even Russia, Israel did not condemn the nuclear tests and did
not join the weapons embargo against New Delhi. Instead, just a few days after the
tests, a delegation from Israeli Aerospace Industries (IAI) visited India to accelerate
the sale of Israeli-made Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs).76 A few weeks later, the
IAI also finalised a large-scale deal to sell India advanced electronic equipment for
warplanes. The fact that this equipment was solely developed and manufactured in
Israel and contained no American technology helped circumvent the existing sanc-
tions, but the US nevertheless opposed the deal by arguing that it violated interna-
tional arms control treaties. In spite of this criticism, Israel honoured the deal that had
been signed in 1996.77 In fact, Israel also assured India that all contracts and joint
ventures which had been negotiated prior to the tests would be respected.78
The initial American apprehensions were, however, put aside in the early 2000s.
At the time, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government was negotiating with Israel
the $1.1 billion purchase of the Phalcon Airborne Warning and Control System
(AWACS). This deal was a game-changer for two main reasons. First, the Phalcon
system brought a new qualitative edge to Indo-Israeli defence operations. Second, the
deal marked the evolution of the US position on technology transfer between Israel
and India. In 2000, under intense pressure from the Clinton administration, Israel had
been forced to cancel the sale of the Phalcon radar system to China despite the loss of
a billion-dollar contract.79 Weary of the Chinese precedent, India and Israel coordi-
nated their efforts with high-ranking US officials during the negotiations. After four
years, Washington finally authorised the Phalcon sale in 2003.80
The success of the Phalcon deal was also the result of a new strategy of political
lobbying from the BJP in Washington. Since Rajiv Gandhi’s tenure, Indian policy-
makers, including in the BJP government, had realised that the engagement of Jewish
organisations based in the US was necessary to mobilise American support for
defence relations with Israel. Since 1992, India and Israel had been regularly discuss-
ing defence exchanges but India could only purchase weapons and technologies
which were exclusively Israeli-made. There were institutional and legal obstacles to
the purchase of the Phalcon AWACS, and of ballistic missile defence systems, as
some of the technology originated from the US. India was still targeted by US
technological embargoes and sanctions which had been imposed after the nuclear
tests of 1974 and 1998. Consequently, India actively engaged American Jewish
organisations to gain the approval of the US administration. Indian–American orga-
nisations like the US–India Political Action Committee have also both emulated and
established institutional links with the American–Israel Political Action Committee
(AIPAC), and the AJC to push for a rapprochement between India and the US.81
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India’s National Security Adviser Brajesh Mishra’s visit to the US and speech to
the AJC in May 2003 must be seen within this objective of improving relations with
both Israel and the US. In his speech, Mishra formulated the idea of a tripartite axis
between the US, Israel and India. Noting that all these countries were democracies
which shared a ‘common vision of pluralism tolerance and equal opportunities’, he
argued that stronger relations between the three countries had a ‘natural logic’.82 He
added that the three democracies shared similar security threats and should form a
‘viable alliance’ to combat the common threat of ‘global terrorism’.83 While there has
been no attempt to follow up with concrete initiatives on these statements, this
appearance of an ideological rapprochement enabled further Indo-Israeli defence
cooperation without any explicit US opposition.
For instance, in other high-technology niche areas such as missile defence where
India had failed to build robust indigenous capabilities, Israel offered key equipment
and expertise, such as the Barak-I point-defence systems that India bought in 2001.84
Israel also proved to be an indirect access to US defence technology (such as sub-
elements of the Arrow system like Green Pine Radar).85 However, the burgeoning
defence partnership between India and Israel has also now created problems for some
US defence industries which are increasingly targeting Indian defence contracts in
niche markets. While Israel stands only in fourth position as arms supplier to India
behind Russia, the US and France, and that Israel and the US will not be directly
contesting major platforms like combat aircrafts, US and Israeli firms have competed
over specific tenders.
A recent example is symptomatic of the possible tensions related to the growing
competition between India and Israel in specific sectors. India originally considered
buying the US-made ‘Javelin’ Anti-Tank Guided Missiles (ATGM). Negotiations
were ‘nearly completed’ for the two countries to jointly develop the ATGM by late
2016.86 However, the negotiations ultimately stalled because of Washington’s reluc-
tance to share technology with India and to not allow India to then indigenously
manufacture the ‘tank killer’ missiles. In parallel, India also discussed with Israel the
supply of the ‘Spike’ third-generation ATGMs. India is reportedly in the final stages
of inking a deal with Israel’s Rafael Advanced Defence Systems for the purchase of
the ATGMs.87 This development has confirmed Israel’s flexibility in technology
transfer and its imposition of very minimal conditions in its dealings with India
compared to the US.
Over the last two decades, Israeli defence industries have proven to be appealing
partners for India because of their willingness to transfer technology and to engage in
joint ventures, production and research and development in high-technology military
equipment.88 By contrast, India–US defence ties have historically been hindered by
suspicion in developing jointly defence platforms.89 In spite of the signing of the
Defence Trade and Technology Initiative (DTTI), and discussions of collaboration on
developing India’s next generation aircraft carrier, India remains wary of the reliability
of the US as a defence partner given past embargoes. American defence industries on
the other hand are still working on how to comply with India’s defence offset policy.
Conclusion
This article’s main objective was to demonstrate that, contrary to popular and even
academic belief in India, the US factor in India–Israel relations has never been
consistent and has evolved over time depending on the personalities, political
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constellations in power in India and the regional developments in West Asia. While
most observers of India–US relations note that one of the foundational disagree-
ments between these powers was American support for Pakistan, few bring up the
early disputes over the creation of the state of Israel. Rarely is it also evoked that
India and the US coordinated their condemnation of Israeli actions during the Suez
crisis of 1956.
Often overlooked by state-centric approaches, another important finding is that
non-state and sub-state actors such as specific political personalities like Congressmen
Celler and Solarz, as well as pro-Israel interest groups based in the US, have played
an important role in shaping the nature of India–Israel ties. The US government has
never consistently or directly attempted to pressure India to change its policy towards
Israel. In fact, it was the opening of an indirect channel of communication of Rajiv
Gandhi with US-based Jewish organisations through the mediation and support of
Congressman Solarz in the 1980s which paved the way for the ultimate establishment
of diplomatic relations in 1992.
Furthermore, while India, Israel and US interests seem to have converged at
some junctures in history like in 2003, their policies and strategies rarely align. As
mentioned previously, India and the US stood together against Israeli actions and
interests in 1956. As detailed in the last section, the US has promoted but also
directly opposed Israeli arms sales to India because of concerns of technology
transfer but also due to increasing competition concerns. Another important devel-
opment to monitor is whether Israel’s ‘clear and purposeful’ engagement of Asian
partners like China and India is not also a response to a more lukewarm or
uncertain US support to its policies over the last decade.90 Whether it has been
driven by President Barack Obama’s explicit criticism of Israel’s settlement policies
or President Donald Trump’s varying rhetoric on the two-state solution, it seems
clear that Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu’s government has been hedging
towards consolidating alternative partnerships in Asia,91 and especially with India,
which remains its main market for defence exports. It remains to be seen, however,
if closer Israel–India ties develop at the expense of the third party in this difficult
strategic equation.
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